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Abstract – This paper proposes a new identity, and its 
underlying meta-data, model. The approach enables secure 
spanning of identity meta-data across many boundaries 
such as health-care, financial and educational institutions, 
including all others that store and process sensitive personal 
data. It introduces the new concepts of Compound 
Personal Record (CPR) and Compound Identifiable 
Data (CID) ontology, which aim to move toward own your 
own data model. The CID model ensures: authenticity of 
identity meta-data; high availability via unified Cloud-
hosted XML data structure; and privacy through 
encryption, obfuscation and anonymity applied to 
Ontology-based XML distributed content. Additionally 
CID via XML ontologies is enabled for identity federation. 
The paper also proposes that access over sensitive data is 
strictly governed through an access control model with 
granular policy enforcement on the service side. This 
includes the involvement of relevant access control model 
entities which are enabled to authorize an ad-hoc break-
glass data access which should give high accountability for 
data access attempts.  
Keywords – identity; ID-based cryptography; health-care; 
obfuscation; anonymization; encryption; privacy; 
Compound Identifiable Data; access control; digital 
signing; 
INTRODUCTION 
Current technology and business trends are moving 
organizations, institutions and enterprises into the cloud, 
although many are aware of the risks, exemplified by the 
recent events which show that even highly protected 
personal data can be seized for processing, without the data 
owner’s consent and knowledge (Kroes, 2013).  
The risks increase: the latest leaks (January 2014) by 
Edward Snowden show that the USA’s National Secure 
Agency (NSA) is involved in an on-going project called 
Penetrating Hard Targets (PHT), which aims to develop a 
super quantum computer enabling US government to 
decrypt information (Rich & Gellman, 2014). As this 
technology will inevitably become widespread over time, 
the conclusion has to be that any Cloud-based model or 
system that will process or store personal data will require 
not only multiple safeguards to protect the confidentiality, 
but also should deliver high accountability enforced by 
governments where personal data is protected by law. 
Cloud-based services can often provide data security which 
delivers data protection sufficient to secure the data from 
                                                        
1 We recognise that this raises the significant question of who can 
exercise ‘ownership’ of data for individuals who cannot exercise it for 
outsider threats, but they cannot protect it from rogue Cloud 
Service Provider (CSP) employees (Mowbray, Pearson, & 
Shen, 2010). Currently, personal data stored by schools, 
hospitals and other organizations often does not meet 
baseline safeguards required to hold such data and is often 
not ready for Cloud-computing era (Hölbl, 2011). 
In this paper, we define personal data as a piece of 
information that identifies an individual directly or 
indirectly (OECD, 2013a). 
In health care, medical organizations store and process 
sensitive personal information, and also need access to 
sensitive data (X. Chen, 2004) to save their patients life at 
any time, without technological and jurisdictional 
constraints (OECD, 2013b). Unfortunately, access to such 
data is mostly restricted to one institution or very often a 
single building.  
Even when personal data is stored and processed within 
secure and well-defined boundaries, problems can arise 
because the there is no oversight by the data owner (ie the 
patient): there are strong indications that Personal Health 
Record (PHR) owners would also like to have full access to 
their own information (eg Buchanan et al., 2013), and also 
to be able to control the rights of access to the records. 
PHRs and even more so the Electronic Health Record 
(EHR) which aggregate them require a platform that will 
allow secure data exchange (Zhang & Liu, 2010) preserving  
privacy across Cloud-based systems (Li, Yu, Zheng, Ren, 
& Lou, 2012). 
Similar problems can be found in educational institutions 
where pupil (Buchanan, Lewis, Fan, & Uthmani, 2012) or 
student information cannot be shared due to legal and 
technological limitations, despite the data owner’s 
expectations. In order to give people full ownership of their 
data and to enable institutions; organizations and 
enterprises around the world to securely share sensitive 
information security professional, as well as governments, 
we must deliver tools, platforms and knowledge base 
applicable to modern environments (Zhou, Varadharajan, & 
Hitchens, 2014). 
In this paper, we will focus on the possibilities for an up-to-
date identity meta-data model that could be designed to be 
ready for globally established secure data processing, cloud 
hosting and extensive authentication. With this model, 
owners would have control over their own data (or be able 
to delegate it to identified affiliated people) starting from 
their birth1. 
themselves (babies, the extremely ill, dementia patients). Space 
constrains mean that this issue of affiliated users (Neubauer & Heurix, 
2011) cannot be addressed here. 
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This work builds on a number of projects including within 
health and social care, including with the UK Technology 
Strategy Board- (TSB) funded project with Chelsea and 
Westminster Hospital in London which focused on creating 
an e-Health Cloud within a hospital environment (Fan, 2011 
and Fan, 2012). This used a novel method of defining the 
ownership of the data, and providing a rights infrastructure 
for the citizen (or patient) to define the rights of access to 
their data. This work has since been extended within a 
number of projects including the TSB Trusted Service 
project, which has focused on integrating both digital and 
human trust, to provide a fully integrated and holistic care 
infrastructure, and which integrates primary and secondary 
health care with assisted living (Ekonomou, 2011 and L, 
2012). 
IDENTITY META-DATA 
PARADIGM 
Currently used digital identity models provide several 
levels of assurance (Buchanan et al., 2013). These levels 
depend on Identity Provider (IP) requirements for the 
authenticity of personal identification. Identities can be 
seen as the unique information sufficient to perform 
operations on objects. This information can be static in 
some identity models but can also vary dependent on claims 
by specific Service Providers (SPs) (Chappell, 2011). 
Data held by the IP can most often be classified as either PII 
(Personally Identifiable Information) (Mccallister & 
Scarfone, 2010) or Personal Data. PII includes home 
addresses, social security numbers or maiden name – that 
is, enough to allow a unique identification of an individual. 
Depending on the authentication architecture supported by 
the IP, the PII meta-data is exchanged as claimed Verified 
Attributes (Buchanan et al., 2013) between IP and SP. 
Unfortunately, this framework has a structural weakness 
resulting from the  lack of a unified, secure identity 
(assuming one is desirable), legally governed certification 
and baseline standards for IPs (Data Protection Working 
Party, 2012) and an easily accessible authoritative 
knowledge base for people registering with IP. 
Identity verification methods require the highest level of 
assurance (Buchanan et al., 2013) with effective safeguards 
against unauthorised PII data divulgence. The new concept 
of Compound Identifiable Data (CID) supports the personal 
responsibility of the object owner over their digital identity 
and its authenticity. As illustrated in Figure 1 below, 
information that is exchanged while an SP is authenticating 
identity consists of an obfuscated unique identity identifier 
(Mowbray et al., 2010) and policies required for further 
authorization. Unlike claims-based identity authentication 
(Chappell, 2011) only conditions can be checked, - the 
identity meta-data cannot be passed to the SP. This new PII 
data flow asks to introduce clear security baselines and 
certification for SPs and Authentication, Authorization, and 
Accounting (AAA) mechanisms (Pearson & Wainwright, 
2013). This model is still vulnerable to more sophisticated 
attacks such as data inference (Salamatian, Zhang, Calmon, 
& Bhamidipati, 2013). 
Finally, in the CID model, an access object can act as a 
subject, depending on the activity context as shown in Fig. 
2. In other words, personal identity (user) may act as an 
object which is also defined under the CID sub-ontology. 
Furthermore, the SP can act as an identity (user) and a 
subject in the data access attempt. Both SP and a personal 
identity require identity and identity meta-data to be legally 
registered to perform specific activities in the shared Cloud 
space. With generic IAM framework, all activities of the 
subject over an access object are logged for further legal 
audits. The technology can benefit from a single, secure 
model where each entity of access control operation is 
equally accountable, as an identity instance inherits generic 
schema whether it is a real person or an automated robot. 
 
Fig. 1 Linked identity with identity meta-data using obfuscated references across several security boundaries and 
contexts 
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Fig. 2 Two different subjects access contexts with identity 
meta-data; f – function matching identity Id with its rights R 
in given context 
 
CID DISTRIBUTION 
To understand the CID model’s flexibility, its cross-
platform integration abilities and its capacity for identity 
and access management (IAM) and federated identity 
management (FIM), we need to define models for CID 
ontology enablement and content distribution. An XML 
identity meta-data schema requires a technique which 
allows different parties to share an XML schema for a 
particular type of content that is attached to a CID. As CID 
content will be spanned across different systems, it has to 
share the core identity element so as maintain its unique 
reference to a single person, while also maintaining several 
different schemas for contextual interpretation. In this way, 
CID shares a core identity element that subjects can use for 
self-identification in the process of accessing objects. The 
core identity ontology should not only identify but also 
represent identity access and operations entitlements in the 
Cloud for various services enabled for different access 
control models. 
One such XML-based ontology is Web Ontology Language 
(OWL) which was designed to define the semantics of the 
relationships between entities. OWL defines what is 
semantically correct in XML, and both deliver data 
framework for the Web as well as for Cloud-based systems. 
OWL has been successfully used for access control systems 
implementation (Finin, Joshi, Niu, Sandhu, & 
Winsborough, 2008) as well as with encrypted distributed 
XML content (Rahaman, Roudier, Miseldine, & Schaad, 
2009). An alternative approach was introduced to deliver 
structures: the Resource Description Framework (RDF) 
together with RDF Schema (RDFS) that defines classes for 
RDF. However, although it seems to be easier to adapt, its 
limitations mean RDF cannot provide the functionality 
sufficient to build reliable Cloud-based CID framework.  
Single ontology is mostly defined by class, sub-class, 
properties and relationships between these within OWL 
ontology (Rahaman et al., 2009). It is also possible to define 
OWL class relationships, where different ontologies can 
share a common parent.  
 Using OWL it is possible to define an ontology for our 
CID, which would allow identity to refer to other identities 
with simple predicate definitions (see Fig. 3). CID, as a 
compound XML model defined under several ontologies, 
can be spanned across several contexts (see Fig. 1). In other 
words, different parts of CID can be stored and processed 
by different organizations. XML parts can be defined under 
various ontologies with different OWL-defined, XML 
schemas. A model where different part of identity meta-data 
are distributed to different service providers enables it to 
make use of a range of existing XML schemas, for instance 
Microsoft HealthVault XML . Only such an approach can 
guarantee that data access to personal information can be 
distributed and efficiently maintained by different Cloud 
service providers. In the health-care sector, the CID model 
aligns with the EHR concept where a range of different (and 
possibly competing) health-care repositories can hold 
patient information (Zhang & Liu, 2010). Secure access to 
distributed data is possible thanks to one identity and 
identity meta-data framework. Securely linked identity-
metadata is an assurance of data integrity and authenticity, 
what is required from new Cloud-based systems. 
Fig. 3 Two subjects in refer to each other in triplet (Subject – 
Predicate – Object) represent linked identities 
 
Distributed XML parts from within CID need to be linked 
in order to refer only to one identity. This secure XML 
linking defines that part of the identity meta-data that 
belongs only to one identity. Such linking is highly 
vulnerable to several types of attack including 
impersonation attack and man-in-the-middle attack. In 
response, the identity-based encryption (IBE) model has 
been successfully utilized to create secure dynamic 
reference for hierarchical data structures similar to the CID 
structure and is discussed further below. 
In summary, individual parts of CID share a common 
ontology designed to support secure links. A mandatory 
obfuscated link is maintained from the main identity XML 
to sub parts of the identity meta-data and back from identity 
meta-data to the main identity. Requests from separate parts 
of identity meta-data can be hosted in a Service Oriented 
Architecture SOA implementation as  shown in Fig. 4. Web 
Service(s) exposed as part of dedicated Cloud-based 
services can process distributed requests using encryption, 
obfuscation and anonymization. Next, each Cloud-based 
service can effectively support such distributed XML model 
with effective XML clusters (Costa & Ortale, 2012), where 
single XML document can be partitioned into several 
clusters. 
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ENCRYPTION, OBFUSCATION 
AND ANONYMIZATION 
A major problem with the Cloud is when it comes to data 
protection, as it seems to be local and personal when, in fact, 
unencrypted data once stored in the Cloud might be the 
subject of direct or indirect processing by third parties. Lack 
of encryption mechanisms used to protect the information 
and the global character of the Cloud causes data leaks 
without data owner control (Mowbray et al., 2010). Even 
encrypted data still brings several risks of data leakage 
because encryption techniques which ensure sufficient 
security require high processing power. This processing 
power is needed to effectively encrypt and decrypt data 
‘live’ in memory, revoke encryption keys to actually 
achieve truly personal data in the Cloud (Pagano & Pagano, 
2011). 
The need for Identity Based Encryption  
Encryption delivers the best security possible for identity 
meta-data. CID data before it is hosted by any Cloud-based 
service should be encrypted by default. The encryption of 
CID is required for every single XML node (Rahaman et 
al., 2009), as they from a sensitive part of hierarchical 
identity meta-data. It should be also applied respectively to 
the XML ontology definition to ensure access control 
granularity (Zhou et al., 2014). 
Encrypted data require secure key repositories able to 
perform revocation when necessary. One approach to 
effective key lifecycle management is Identity-based 
Encryption (IDE) with self-expiring keys (Boneh & 
Franklin, 2003). In Cloud-based implementations, IDE 
works efficiently by introducing ephemeral cryptographic 
keys. In IBE with public-key encryption the public key can 
be derived from unique identity identifier, therefore, this 
approach reduces the need for certificate authorities and 
public key certificates (Yao, Fazio, Dodis, & Lysyanskaya, 
2004). Different types of IBE implementations provide 
benefits for different system models. Forward-secure 
hierarchical ID-based encryption (fs-HIBE) has  
successfully been used for several identity and access 
management IAM implementations; it allows secure 
dynamic joins between identities, making use of time 
constraints and dynamic key revocation (Yao et al., 2004). 
Multiple hierarchical ID-based encryption scheme 
(MHIBE) is another concept derived from generalization of 
fs-HIBE. MHIBE is not only highly suitable for federated 
identity management systems such as this but, because of 
the ability of encryption with multiple ID-tuples, it can be 
efficiently used with the role-based access control (RBAC) 
systems implementations (Yao et al., 2004) discussed later. 
The main technological problem with effective data 
protection is the efficiency of encryption algorithms when 
encrypted information requires indexing (Mowbray et al., 
2010). Several methods can be used in parallel for 
encryption to effectively index unencrypted XML data (Luk 
et al., 2002), although implementation would require 
further techniques to protect the PII data in the CPR which 
actually consists of PHR and EHR data. 
How then can the CPR (following its owner’s consent) or 
other data from identity meta-data be effectively found and 
used for processing from among billions of other records 
that are stored in the Cloud? Answers include XML 
obfuscation (Mowbray et al., 2010) and anonymization (Ye, 
Wu, Hu, & Hu, 2013), techniques which provide high 
performing searching and indexing algorithms, ensuring the 
accessibility required. 
Obfuscation 
Obfuscation methods aim to hide data so it cannot be 
directly processed. Obfuscated data allows the object owner 
to reveal only the necessary information required to execute 
an operation on that information without exposing PII 
information. For example, a health Cloud-based services 
provider could introduce a technique where patient’s 
identity is not a subject of exchange between parties; 
instead, only unique pseudonyms are exchanged between 
parties to securely satisfy claims (Mowbray et al., 2010). 
Obfuscation uses basic cryptographic techniques to hide 
rather than encrypt data. These methods use keys and 
functions to derive obfuscated information that corresponds 
to identity meta-data, but which do not disclose actual 
information (Mowbray et al., 2010). To decide which part 
of identity meta-data should be obfuscated, policy-based 
obfuscation can be used, where different policies enforces 
obfuscation of specific fields before these are made 
available for Cloud-based processing. The privacy manager 
implementation proposed by Mowbray et al (2010) for 
personal data obfuscation can almost transparently integrate 
with existing applications, thus this is a reasonable 
safeguard that ensures data security due-care principals. 
Anonymization 
Another approach is anonymization. Often, for example, in 
research and monitoring aggregate data, it is acceptable to 
process anonymized data. k-anonymization techniques are 
widely studied as part of artificial intelligence research. 
They apply to dataset processing where sophisticated attack 
techniques like data linking (data inference) can be used to 
uniquely identify individual from among other records that 
are not directly exposed for processing (Kisilevich, Rokach, 
Elovici, & Shapira, 2010). Quasi-identifiers (QIs) can be 
derived using k-anonymity from the table of k number of 
records, where derived k-anonymous table ensures 
anonymity of the QI among the other k-1 records (Ye et al., 
2013). k-anonymization can be effectively used to securely 
deliver statistical data, therefore, all personal data 
processing, which requires generalized information rather 
than identity specific data should be delivered via 
anonymization. 
 
5 
 
Fig. 4 Calling identity meta-data by obfuscated reference under SOA (possible use case) 
 
INTEGRITY & AUTHENTICITY 
Identity meta-data must provide the most accurate 
information possible. It should ensure not only data quality, 
but also data integrity and authenticity. Data quality can be 
maintained with well-designed XML ontologies applied at 
different CID contexts. Data integrity gives assurance that 
data has not been amended since the last valid data change 
was committed. Authenticity ensures that the subject 
identified as the last data processor actually initiated the 
data transaction. Because changes made over CID are not 
accountable at the CID level and require dedicated 
functionality responsible for accounting, the identity meta-
data needs to deliver basic integrity and authenticity 
assurance. This assurance can be guaranteed with a digital 
signature applied to the part of information that requires 
data integrity. As the digital signature can be derived not 
only from the information, but can be bound with a unique 
identifier, it can be used for information which requires data 
authenticity (Bartel, Boyer, Fox, LaMacchia, & Simon, 
2008). 
For a CID model, we need to ensure that a malicious or 
ignorant subject did not amend the information, that 
information was changed in the current identity context and 
an entitled subject processed that information. 
The access control models we described here use signing 
for nonrepudiation and integrity enforcement; however, 
identity meta-data requires same enforcement at the level of 
actual data. For instance using our emergency access 
example, where a medical professional needs to access a 
patient’s data to check their medical history, if an 
unauthorized subject (including the data owner) amended 
medical history, it may have critical consequences leading 
to patient’s death. 
Digital signing cryptography requires secure keys to derive 
a signature. Public-key infrastructure (PKI) and ID-based 
signing (IBS) are two different approaches we can use to 
deliver keys (Kiltz, Neven, CWI Amsterdam, IBM Zürich 
Research laboratory, & Katholieke Universitet Leuven, 
2009). While PKI involves trusted certification authorities 
(CAs) to certify public keys and bind them with digital 
identity, in IBS public key consists of an identity unique 
identifier, therefore, it simplifies implementation model by 
eliminating CA entity from key management lifecycle. 
To keep the CID model as homogeneous as possible and 
therefore the final framework simple, we will focus on IBS 
as a preferred digital signing technique. IBS and ID-based 
encryption share the same concept for secure key 
management. IBS, unlike IBE, can use certificates issued 
by an involved trusted authority (TA) based on identity 
identifier and assigned public key. IBS certificate do not 
require a CA, as it is simply a digital signature derived from 
public key and identity unique identifier (Kiltz et al., 2009). 
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As an alternative to certificates, IBS can utilize hierarchical 
ID-based encryption (HIBE), the encryption, which was 
discussed above as a preferred CID encryption method. 
Hierarchical IBS (HIBS) schemas become very useful when 
combined with HIBE (Gentry & Silverberg, 2002) as HIBE 
schema derived from content encryption can be transformed 
into HIBS schema. The digital signing and verification 
processes are, therefore, simplified. 
 
Fig. 5 CID authentication in SOA 
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ACCESS CONTROL 
Role Based Access Control 
Most mature modern access control models that are ready 
to securely protect the asset (such as PII), from 
unauthorized access, hardly span outside a simple boundary 
(Spyra, 2012). The best-known model, Role-Based Access 
Control (RBAC) can be easily adapted for highly secure 
end-to-end identity provisioning and revocation within 
specific security contexts. A role is assigned with an 
identity for a set of transactions, for example, as the ability 
for a doctor to access patient data and take further actions 
according to new circumstances and patient history 
(Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 1992) then update the patient record. 
This access control model controls the subject access over 
the object, based on roles assigned to the subject in the 
organization, which defines a security boundary (Zhou et 
al., 2014).  
Roles can span across several systems and well-integrated 
infrastructures can ensure role change enforcement on the 
end system. Furthermore, well-defined roles and consistent 
RBAC system implementation are safeguards against 
several security threats such as collusion, creeping 
privileges and excessive privileges. Enforcement of 
separation of duties is a countermeasure for collusion attack 
(Sandhu, Ferraiolo, & Kuhn, 2012), while the principle of 
least privilege overcomes problems of creeping privileges 
and excessive privileges (Stewart, Tittel, & Chapple, 2011). 
Although RBAC ensures high security within an 
organization, it does not introduce a name space that can be 
implemented across organizations, for example, in an open 
Cloud space.  However, several research studies have 
shown that when combined with an OWL to deliver 
Ontology-based XML content (Rahaman et al., 2009), 
RBAC can be adapted for global Cloud-based IAM 
solutions.  
The CID model requires the RBAC concept with its several 
variations to enforce control and secure identity with its 
meta-data in the Cloud. To protect policy that is applied on 
the object in the Cloud and accessed as a part of RBAC 
transaction the part that exposes the policy can be encrypted 
(Zhou et al., 2014). The new concept of Cryptographic 
RBAC for Cloud addresses several security threats that 
have roots in early RBAC architectures, where this access 
control model had closed security boundaries such as 
enterprises, organizations and institutions. Role-based 
Encryption is a model that allows data encryption before it 
is handed-over to the Cloud provider, thus ensuring that 
only data owners and identities that hold the required access 
role can decrypt the information. 
CID requires also clearly defined ontology to reach Cloud 
maturity for RBAC. There are several approaches emerging 
that introduce standardized RBAC in different sectors, one, 
the Enhanced RBAC, is focused on clinical education, 
biomedical research, and patient care (Le, Doll, Barbosu, 
Luque, & Wang, 2012). This work clearly highlights the 
fact that there is a need to define strict ontologies where 
Enhanced RBAC could be applied. These ontologies would 
constrain and help to define CPR ontology to enable it for 
access control in the Cloud. 
RBAC implementations can have disadvantages. One of 
them is the existence of a single point of failure in case of 
attack that aims to compromise the central access 
management system. XML-based data where RBAC is used 
to control access can still be protected using distributed 
access control system (López, Maña, & Yagüe, 2002). 
Distributed access control systems can be scaled and 
adapted for Cloud-based implementations. This problem 
was also addressed with Cryptographic RBAC (C-RBAC) 
(Zhou et al., 2014) and, unlike the distributed access control 
approach; this model was designed for Cloud-based IAM 
systems implementation. C-RBAC uses policies that are 
enforced via Cloud services and which can be controlled in 
a decentralized manner by the data owner. 
Finally, to deliver the fully homogeneous model, there are 
ARBAC97 and SARBAC models, which aim to provide 
control over RBAC systems including granular role 
hierarchy amendments, new policy definitions and all other 
administrative operations which are fully controlled via a 
dedicated roles set (Zhou et al., 2014). 
This new identity meta-data model requires a highly 
reliable and efficient encryption and access control model. 
The most vulnerable and sensitive part of the CID, the 
compound personal record (CPR), needs safeguards that 
will make data securely available not only to data owner but 
also to authorized data processors. 
In summary, the RBAC model can become a very powerful 
access control model suitable for Cloud-based services but 
only when supported with relevant implementation 
guidelines and baselines, which enforce security policies 
and legal regulations. 
Attribute Based Access Control 
The Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) provides 
another approach to govern access, by giving the data 
owner full control over their data. In the ABAC model, 
roles are bound into role attributes and are attached to a data 
element through attributes based encryption (ABE) (Yang 
& Jia, 2014). The ABAC model can coexist with RBAC and 
easily enables RBAC beyond a single security boundary 
(Spyra, 2012). 
ABE allows the data owner to encrypt the personal data 
under specific attributes. Same attributes are attached to 
subjects who will process the data (Li et al., 2012). CID 
model and especially CPR meta-data have to use access 
control system with encryption applied to access control 
properties that are attached to data. 
The ABE model has been proposed as the most suitable 
technology for Cloud-based global data access (Yang & Jia, 
2014), although ABAC among other access control models 
described here have specific features in combination can 
satisfy CID model. There seems to be an increasing interest 
in ABE as demand on electronic health-care systems has 
grown in the last few years (Li et al., 2012). 
Attribute-based infrastructures have been proposed as ready 
for handling PII information for instance a  special 
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implementation of ABE called cipher text policy ABE (CP-
ABE) with message broadcasting enables an ABAC system 
to perform ad hoc direct revocation (Hur & Noh, 2011). As 
with RBAC, the main problem with CP-ABE is single trust 
authority (TA) that can be used to decrypt data. Key escrow 
enables a single TA to decrypt all the information and a 
compromised TA provides the potential attacker access to 
all the protected data. A way to overcome this problem is 
multiple-authority ABE (MA-ABE) where each TA 
releases only a partial secret key that is used to encrypt 
information.  On the other hand key revocation under this 
approach creates a bottleneck where each TA needs to be 
involved in keys lifecycle (Li et al., 2012).  
While CP-ABE allows data owners to decide on attribute 
structure defining permissions before encrypting data sent 
into the Cloud, the other approach key-policy ABE (KP-
ABE) uses policies to define permissions and the data 
owner assigns attributes to define encrypted data (Hur & 
Noh, 2011). Service managing policies for KP-ABE, 
automatically generates access structure for the data then 
combines access policies into keys (Li et al., 2012). 
All of the ABE techniques described here struggle with 
weak revocation thus there are on-going research projects 
to create an effective and efficient keys revocation 
algorithm for ABAC systems (Yang & Jia, 2014). 
Sticky-policies 
The ABAC model gives more control over owned data via 
attributes that define access domain; sticky-policies 
approach go further by giving the data owner granular 
control over each piece of personal information. PII data 
seeks for access control model which can enforce legal 
regulations regarding data protection (OECD, 2013a) and 
which can be easily adapted for Cloud-based 
implementations. CID requires technology which will 
easily integrate with encrypted XML content, while CPR 
seeks for highly reliable access control model to protect PII 
and grant access to personal data only when access 
entitlement is followed by relevant legal consent. 
Sticky-policies make use of trust authorities (TA), which 
validate compliance with policies in order to lease 
decryption keys. Policies likewise cover data owner 
consent, give subject rights to process data. Model where 
TA has to be contacted by the service provider (SP) to 
access PII data delivers high accountability. Each personal 
data access attempt is a subject of auditing (Pearson, 
Bramhall, & HP Laboratories, 2003) and can be tracked in 
case of data leakage incident. 
The data owner can then feel that they own the data released 
into the Cloud because of not only the policies associated 
with data following data owner approval, but also for the 
TA, which specifies where the policy can be interpreted, 
and is pre-selected by the data owner (Pearson, Mont, & 
Kounga, 2011). Information about the TA is attached to the 
policy and is passed to SP. XML schema that can store 
sticky-policy definition can be easily integrated into CID. 
The content of the policy definitions can be encrypted using 
ID-based encryption (IBE) (Pearson et al., 2003). Both 
policies and data encrypted with IBE add security on top of 
the sticky-policies model, however the bottleneck of this 
method is that encryption applied this way makes data 
heavy-weighted (Pearson et al., 2011). 
The CID model requires the IBE to securely bound identity 
meta-data together across different security contexts. In 
both cases, Cloud-based implementation would need 
introducing additional entity, which takes care of IBE 
related operations. Having in mind a larger picture, the 
system model for identity meta-data can be simplified and 
the Cloud services hosting CID can be generalized. 
Purpose-based Access Control 
All the above access models control access based on 
entitlements granted and detailed access policies. Another 
model, a Purpose-based access control allows long-term 
maintenance of access granted at some point of time (Sun 
& Wang, 2012) and enforces need-to-know and need-to-
have principles. In more traditional access control model 
from the moment when access is granted to subject via 
either role or direct assignment this access relationship from 
subject to object is preserved over time unless relevant 
auditing procedures enforce access control review and 
revoke creeping privileges (Stewart et al., 2011). This 
purpose justifies the subject to store, process or access an 
object (Sun & Wang, 2012). It can be defined under 
intended purpose and access purpose categories. Therefore, 
the access decision is made based on the correlation 
between the intended purpose and the access purpose. 
Intended purpose fall into three components: Allowable 
Intended Purpose (AIP), Conditional Intended Purpose 
(CIP) and Prohibited Intended Purpose (PIP) (M. Chen, 
Yang, & Hwang, 2013). Where AIP defines unrestricted 
data access, CIP conditional data access and PIP denies any 
access for given purpose. Combined with access purpose, 
which can consist of single RBAC assignment, the data 
access is enhanced by very granular control (M. Chen et al., 
2013). 
As RBAC model was successful in delivering effective 
access control functionality and became widely adopted in 
many enterprises, it is reasonable to consider integration of 
RBAC with policy-based access control model (M. Chen et 
al., 2013). 
The concept of access purpose is not an integral part of any 
of the previously described access control models. 
Although it does not mean that related security procedures 
cannot define circumstances where the subject becomes 
entitled to process data under the defined access control 
model. The purpose-based access control model shows that 
there is a need for legal baselines and guidelines for Cloud-
based IAM implementations. In a global model, access to 
PII should only be allowed through a single legal 
framework to prevent data redundancy, therefore avoiding 
inconsistent access management system where data can be 
processed because of conflicting definitions of legally 
justified access purposes. 
Break-Glass - emergency access 
Complete identity and access management (IAM) system 
consists not only of technologies but also of relevant 
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security policies and procedures built to support access 
control and provide reliable accountability of a subject’s 
activities over an object. In most generic scenarios, a 
subject is entitled to process data when it is granted rights 
at some point of time. Rights are granted based on subject 
roles assignment, or based on direct permissions applied to 
the object. In a secured environment, before PII data can be 
processed, the subject requires a consent (OECD, 2013a).  
Now let us analyse a person’s experience of an accident 
abroad, and where a medical professional needs to access 
the patient’s personal record - which is CPR data - and due 
to injury, the patient cannot approve doctor’s access to it. 
This scenario requires a dedicated and strictly controlled 
Break-Glass process allowing access to personal data to be 
subject to post-processing approval (Li et al., 2012). Such 
access attempt should trigger communication channels that 
inform the relevant authorities (e.g. supervisor of the person 
performing a Break-Glass access, local health-care practice 
where patient is registered). Next, in most cases, access 
needs to be justified by the person performing the 
emergency access, and then afterwards by the relevant 
authorities. Break-Glass action thus requires legal 
enforcement to account each occurrence of the emergency 
access. 
Whichever access control model is be used with the new 
identity model, an identity service provider SP should 
obtain legal approval to perform several types of ‘break-
glass’ authentication like Claim-based identity (Chappell, 
2011) where Verified Attributes, that are classified as 
personal identifiable information (PII), are claimed. PII 
information cannot be passed to SP without legal consent. 
Most of the modern SPs do not respect data protection 
principals (Hölbl, 2011). Often a client provides PII data to 
SP without understanding the implications. With the CID 
model person would not need to provide any data online to 
the SP. When individual approves access to own PII the SP 
would be allowed to only claim this information, which has 
a legal justification and authoritative approval. 
RELATED WORK 
This paper provides an overview of secure models, which it 
is argued combine to give a solid foundation for a new 
reliable Cloud-based identity meta-data model. Many 
identity and PII data related models recognize security 
issues that come with Cloud computing (Mowbray et al., 
2010; Pearson & Wainwright, 2013) propose methods to 
enforce accountability over data retrieved from the shared 
space. Others (Li et al., 2012) also focused on data 
protection in the health-care context propose to find the 
most suitable encryption and access control model but also 
propose a mature framework for Cloud-based 
implementations. 
Several works (Jain & Farkas, 2013; Le et al., 2012) aim to 
deliver a unified XML model, which can be adapted under 
several security contexts like health-care, education 
institutions, enterprises and other. Here is worth mentioning 
Microsoft, which initiated its HealthVault development 
project which were defined in detail several XML schemas 
ready to adapt in medical institutions. The World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C) leads in addressing security 
aspects of XML. The W3C has created the W3C XML 
Signature Working Group focused on digital signatures and 
W3C XML Encryption Working Group specialized in 
encrypted content. 
Publicly exposed data requires several safeguards, and, in 
this field, works (M. Chen et al., 2013; Sun & Wang, 2012) 
related to purpose-based access control models play an 
important role as they aim to fill an existing gap not 
addressed with any previously existing access control 
model. Currently the most important non-technically 
related work is done by OECD (OECD, 2013b) and aims to 
deliver legal frameworks that ensure data protection and 
address privacy concerns related to Cloud-based computing 
era. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
This paper shows that there are techniques and technologies 
ready to be used in modern Cloud-based systems to deliver 
a global secure distributed service to everyone, independent 
of their location but ideally within a common legal 
framework, their assigned health-care system or the internal 
business model of organizations. The model presented thus 
delivers secure functionality that enables global access to 
identity-centric sensitive data. 
Data protection is driven by technology, law and social 
convention. The focus of this paper has been technological 
solutions, but these make most sense in the context of strong 
data protection laws such as implemented by European 
countries which comply with data protection principals to 
that identifiable information about people is stored and 
processed with respect to people’s fundamental rights to 
privacy (OECD, 2013b). A weakness in the current 
framework is that once stored in the Cloud, PII data or any 
information can be classified as divulged data (Pearson et 
al., 2011). Currently loss of governance and data leakage 
are the highest concerns related to Cloud services (Pearson 
& Wainwright, 2013).  
The common problem with distributed XML data is that its 
implementation requires highly secure Cloud-based 
services for hosting. This includes encryption applied on 
data level to ensure that personal information will not be 
compromised, and become a subject of illegal processing in 
case of data leakage on the CSP side. The issue that requires 
further discussion is related to encryption aging when 
encrypted data is seized and stored until technology (such 
as quantum decryption) reaches a maturity level sufficient 
to break the encryption applied. This scenario may require 
well-designed dedicated Cloud-based services, which 
provide best security possible for CID identity meta-data 
but only in distinguished context. These could benefit from 
XML data clustering, which ensures high data availability 
(Costa & Ortale, 2012). Such services, if compromised, 
would guarantee that only fragments of personal data are 
exposed, but the PII remains un-compromised. 
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Accounting of CID it is another topic which requires further 
research. With this, digital signatures can validate 
information integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation only 
for the last committed change. An historical insight can be 
only be delivered with reliable accounting, which can either 
log each data fragment update, or take complete identity 
meta-data snap-shots. An important research area is thus the 
enforcement of proper accountability for CID. 
Cloud-based system enabled to host global identity for 
Cryptographic RBAC require highly reliable revocation 
techniques where not only user, here the subject, is removed 
from the role, but also the role is either revoked or renewed 
in case of encryption keys or the role itself being 
compromised. There is thus a need for further research 
looking at all the security-related processes around existing 
access control models, and which are ready for CID 
management in the Cloud. Along with this further work is 
required to clearly defined Service Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) design listing baseline entities of authentication, 
authorization, accounting, keys management, access, 
identification, identity provisioning, identity revocation and 
data hosting and processing. 
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Table 1. Selected access control models brief 
Access 
Control 
Advantages Disadvantages 
RBAC  Separation of Duties 
 Applied during identity 
provisioning/revocation 
 Traditional RBAC implementations hardly 
scalable outside boundaries (e.g. enterprises) 
 Missing globally established generic roles for 
Cloud 
 No legal enforcement outside security boundary 
ABAC  Separation of Duties 
 Applied during or after identity 
provisioning/revocation 
 Easy to scale outside boundaries 
 More granular access control than RBAC 
 Missing globally established generic set of 
policies for Cloud 
 No legal enforcement outside security boundary 
Sticky-
policies 
 Enables the most granular access control 
model 
 Gives owner full control over PII data 
access 
 More granular access control than ABAC 
 Policies may become hard to maintain over time 
 Missing globally established generic set of 
policies for Cloud 
Purpose-
based 
Access 
Control 
with RBAC 
 Introduces more specific RBAC framework 
for personal data processing 
 Effectively enforces a need-to-know 
principle 
 Missing globally established generic set of 
policies for Cloud 
 No legal enforcement outside security boundary 
 
 
